Updated threats to shipping in the Red Sea

Update 29 November 2024

The Red Sea crisis has seen several significant incidents and developments in recent weeks. On 10 October, the product tanker OLYMPIC SPIRIT was struck by a projectile. On 28 October, the bulk carrier MOTARO was targeted three times while sailing with AIS off but was not hit, and on 12 November, an unknown vessel reported explosions near Hudaydah but continued its voyage without damage. On 17 November, the bulk carrier ANADOLU S was targeted by a missile in the Red Sea and later in the Gulf of Aden, but no impact was reported.

On 3 November, the Houthis announced the intended expansion of potential targets to include merchant ships formerly owned by Israeli companies, even if these ships have been resold and no longer have direct links to Israel. This escalation broadens the range of potential targets and complicates the already challenging landscape of maritime security in the region.

The Houthis have stuck mainly to their targeting criteria, with some attacks based on outdated information. They claimed that the ANADOLU S was targeted due to its owner's past dealings with Israel.

The Houthis have achieved their strategic goal in the Bab el Mandeb and are likely to adopt a more reactive posture, responding to the events unfolding in the Middle East. The Houthis have tied their campaign to the offensive in Lebanon, stating that Israel should cease operations in Gaza and Lebanon for the campaign in the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb region to stop.

Geopolitically, the Red Sea region has become a focal point due to escalating Houthi attacks. The Houthi militia has intensified attacks on Israel and maritime traffic around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. There is a call for a regional framework that includes Israel, Arab states, and major powers like the US and China to maintain maritime security. However, concrete developments on this front have yet to be forthcoming.

Update 3 October 2024

The latest security threat update from Risk Intelligence for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden highlights significant developments in the region, primarily driven by recent geopolitical events and ongoing conflicts. On 1 October the Panama-flagged crude oil tanker CORDELIA MOON was struck by unknown projectiles and later by a drone, causing damage to a ballast tank. On the same day, the Liberia-flagged bulk carrier MINOAN COURAGE was hit by a missile, resulting in damage near the engine room and causing the vessel to drift.

The Houthis have resumed their attacks after a four-week lull, targeting two vessels in reaction to the Israeli offensive in Lebanon. One vessel was struck with a waterborne IED, indicating a heightened risk of catastrophic damage.

The Israeli assassination of Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and the subsequent offensive in Lebanon have escalated tensions in the region. The Axis of Resistance, including the Houthis, have reacted to these events, leading to increased maritime threats.

It is strongly recommended for shipowners and operators to conduct thorough threat and risk assessments before transiting the area. Enhanced contingency plans, crew briefings, and scenario drills are essential to mitigate the risks posed by the current security situation.

In addition to the developments in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the Israeli ground operation in southern Lebanon has raised several critical questions regarding commercial maritime operations. The Israeli military's intentions remain uncertain, but the offensive is formally presented as an act of self-defense aimed at allowing the return of internally displaced persons to northern Israel. The operation involves targeting Hezbollah strongholds, including ports and facilities in southern Lebanon. While Hezbollah is not expected to mount a substantial counteroffensive, the group may direct its limited resources towards attacking Israeli military assets. The escalation has not significantly changed the nature and incentives of Hezbollah, but the potential for military strikes on Lebanese civilian infrastructure remains a distinct possibility. Maritime operators are advised to stay informed and prepared for any changes in the security environment.

Update July to September 2024

The security situation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has been increasingly volatile.

The latest update of this article provides an overview of the incidents and threats faced by merchant vessels from July to September 2024.

The Houthis have demonstrated their capability to conduct attacks despite ongoing military strikes, and the situation requires close monitoring and adherence to security guidelines for safe navigation in the region.

September 2024

The security threat in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden remained high, with the Houthis targeting multiple vessels, including the crude oil tankers BLUE LAGOON I and AMJAD, using missiles and UAVs, causing light damage to the vessels.

The situation continued to be tense, with the Houthis targeting several vessels, including the crude oil tankers DELTA ATLANTICA and SOUNION, and the bulk carrier SW NORTH WIND I, using various means such as drone boats and skiffs.

The threat level for vessels linked to Israel and countries involved in military operations remained severe.

The Houthis persisted in their operations against ships linked to Israel and countries involved in military operations, expanding their target pool to include vessels trading with Israel.

Despite US and UK military strikes having some impact on Houthi capabilities, the threat remained high.

The most recent update highlighted continued attacks on merchant vessels, including the crude oil tanker BLUE LAGOON I, targeted by missiles.

The overall situation remained tense, with the Houthis maintaining their capability to conduct attacks despite ongoing military strikes.

Diplomatic efforts are ongoing to manage the conflict, but the risk to maritime traffic in the region remains high.

August 2024

The security threat in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden persisted with several incidents involving merchant vessels.

The Houthis continued their operations against ships linked to Israel and countries involved in military operations, expanding their target pool to include vessels trading with Israel.

Despite US and UK military strikes having some impact on Houthi capabilities, the threat remains high.

Continued attacks were highlighted, including the crude oil tanker SOUNION, which was attacked by skiffs carrying armed personnel.

The overall situation remains tense, with the Houthis maintaining their capability to conduct attacks despite ongoing military strikes.

Diplomatic efforts are ongoing to manage the conflict, but the risk to maritime traffic in the region remains high.

The security situation continued to be precarious, with the Houthis targeting several vessels, including the container ship GROTON and the crude oil tankers DELTA BLUE and DELTA ATLANTICA, using various means such as missiles and drone boats.

Despite ongoing military operations, the Houthis have maintained their ability to conduct attacks, leading to a severe threat level for vessels linked to Israel and countries involved in military operations.

July 2024

The security situation in the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden remains highly volatile, with numerous incidents involving missiles, drones, and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs) with multiple attacks on merchant vessels primarily targeting those linked to Israel and countries involved in military operations against Houthi forces.

The Houthis have expanded their target pool to include vessels trading with Israel, leading to a severe threat level for these ships.

Despite US and UK military strikes degrading Houthi missile launch capabilities, the threat remains high.

The escalation continued with several attacks, including the container ship PUMBA, targeted by aerial and naval drones as well as missiles, likely in retaliation for an Israeli strike on Hudaydah port.

The Houthis have demonstrated their capability to conduct attacks despite ongoing military strikes against their positions.

The situation remained tense with continued attacks on merchant vessels, including the container ship LOBIVIA and the crude oil tanker CHIOS LION, showing the Houthis' resilience and adaptability in their tactics, maintaining a high level of threat to maritime traffic in the region.

Update 25 June 2024

In recent days, serious attacks on vessels have been reported in the Red Sea.

A Houthi strike against Liberia-flagged bulk carrier TUTOR on 12 June off the Red Sea port of Hodeidah is reported to have flooded its engine room, disabled the vessel and forcing its crew to abandon it. The vessel was reportedly struck by a waterborne drone ("WBIED") with two dummies mounted on it. One crew member is missing and presumed deceased inthe engine room.

Two salvage vessels were on their way to recover the Tutor when they were informed that the ship was believed to have sunk – making the TUTOR the second ship sunk by the Houthis in the region since November.

Another Houthi strike occurred last week, against the Palau-flagged general cargo VERBENA setting fire to the vessel and wounding one crew member. The vessel was later reported to be sinking and on fire and had been struck again by a Houthi missile following the first strike.

Risk Intelligence has opined that the choice of deploying WBIEDs remains a relatively rare one with the Houthis likely aware of the increased threat they pose to vessels, given their impact at the waterline.

The Houthis also announced that they had conducted "joint attacks" against Israeli ports on the Mediterranean however, Risk Intelligence reports that this movement is affiliated with the Axis of Resistance and has no significant maritime component to its activities.

Overall, the threat level to vessels directly owned by Israeli companies has been severe since the beginning of the Houthi campaign. Such vessels, therefore, largely stopped transiting the Red Sea, leading the Houthis to expand their potential targets to vessels trading with Israel. Some attacks were likely carried out based on outdated information in publicly available databases, underlining the threat level for collateral damage. Understandably, shipowners are fearful of the increased activity from the Houthi rebels, who are seven months into a fierce campaign targeting one of the key arteries of world trade.

Based on recent Risk Intelligence reports, the Houthi forces have expanded their target range in response to military operations like Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon Archer. This expansion now includes merchant vessels associated with countries involved in these operations, significantly increasing the risk for ships directly linked to these initiatives.

The Houthis have also broadened their criteria for acceptable targets, now including any vessel owned by companies that trade with Israel, regardless of whether the specific ship has docked at Israeli ports.

Vessels connected to nations solely supporting defensive operations like Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides face a comparatively lower threat level than those linked to countries engaged in offensive actions against Houthi forces. However, the threat level remains consistent for all other commercial vessels.

For ships associated with countries participating in Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides, the primary concern is the potential for direct attacks, although this is currently deemed unlikely due to the Houthis' careful target selection aligned with their broader political goals.

Vessels not affiliated with these operations face risks primarily from misidentification or collateral damage due to proximity to targeted ships or military interceptions of drones and missiles.

Given the fluid nature of the situation, it is crucial to continuously monitor developments and adjust risk assessments accordingly.

Update 29 May 2024

Threats issued by Houthis

The Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC) in Sana’a, Yemen, linked to the Houthis, has a history of sending email warnings to merchant vessels and listing the criteria for banning ships in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea, often stating that certain ships are barred from transiting based on previous public declarations from Houthi representatives.

Unfortunately, these warnings have proven to be more than empty threats.

It is important to note that the HOCC lacks internationally recognised authority to dictate terms of transit. Nonetheless, the HOCC has recently issued similar emails to shipowners and managers threatening several vessels that have docked at an Israeli port or is scheduled to call at one by stating that the vessel has been included in the ban list within a "sanctions program linked to vessels entering the usurping Israeli entity ports".

It is crucial to consider these threats within the broader context of the Middle Eastern situation, especially given the Houthis' statements about their willingness to target ships even in the eastern Mediterranean. As such, shipowners and managers must be prepared to make quick decisions if targeted and should practice Crisis Management responses with all relevant stakeholders. All deck movements should be halted where possible when transiting heightened-risk areas, and bridge personnel should remain vigilant and ready to respond to any threats.

Current situation

Risk Intelligence reports a loosening of Houthi targeting parameters, possibly to exploit the Gaza situation further. The Houthis now consider all vessels from shipping companies sailing to Israel as legitimate targets. This expands the potential targets, but technical limitations may challenge their execution.

On 18 May, the WIND, a Greek-owned, Panama-flagged oil tanker, was struck by a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile while traveling southbound. The vessel reportedly had ties to Russian and Venezuelan oil interests, with speculation that it was carrying oil from Russia to China, both allies of the Houthis’ Iranian backer. However, there is no confirmed link to any of the criteria the Houthis claim to rely on. Houthi media claimed they had targeted a nearby vessel. Some view this incident as indicating that the Houthis do not discriminate in their targeting and may strike any vessel within range.

Risk Intelligence suggests multiple plausible explanations for the strike, including missile malfunction or outdated ownership information. Reports indicate the intended target was a nearby vessel, and the strike on the WIND was incidental. Notably, the WIND had its AIS turned off after sailing south of Marsa Alam in Egypt and was struck while the AIS was off, contradicting claims that turning off AIS prevents Houthi strikes. Risk Intelligence opined that the Houthis employ detection and tracking systems beyond commercial AIS, and that the missile systems available to them are unlikely to be linked to commercial databases that differentiate vessel ownership or status. Typically, anti-ship missiles with older detection systems rely on onboard systems to detect targets once in a designated area, increasing the risk of collateral damage and unintended strikes, especially in proximity to other ships.

Update 16 May 2024

Escalating maritime threats from Yemen's Houthis

Threats to the Eastern Mediterranean

On 3 May 2024, Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree'a announced that the group would extend its operations to the Eastern Mediterranean, threatening to strike vessels bound for Israel. This statement has caused significant concern within the maritime industry. However, substantial doubts remain regarding the Houthis' capacity to carry out such an attack independently and with any significant impact.

Israel's Mediterranean coast is approximately 2,000 km from Houthi-controlled territory. While this distance is theoretically within the range of Houthi weapons, past long-range attack claims, such as those on MERCER STREET (1,500 km) and Yanbu' (1,450 km), have faced credibility issues. Risk Intelligence and coalition force sources have expressed scepticism about the Houthis' ability to deploy ordnance effectively over such distances without external assistance .

Unconfirmed attacks in the Indian Ocean

On 9 May 2024, Saree'a claimed that the Houthis had targeted three Israeli-linked vessels — MSC GINA, MSC DEGO, and MSC VITTORIA — in the Indian Ocean. These claims, however, lack independent verification, consistent with the Houthis' history of uncorroborated assertions. The group has broadened its targeting parameters, declaring any vessel from companies trading with Israel as legitimate targets. Despite this rhetorical expansion, their technical limitations remain significant obstacles to striking moving targets at long ranges.

First confirmed Indian Ocean attack

According to Lloyd's List, the Houthis conducted their first successful attack in the Indian Ocean on 26 April 2024. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) targeted a merchant vessel approximately 300-400 nautical miles southeast of the Horn of Africa. The vessel, likely chosen due to perceived Israeli affiliations, sustained minor damage, with no casualties reported. Debris from a UAV was found onboard. The ship stopped transmitting Automatic Identification System (AIS) data at 0555 hrs on 27 April local time and did not reappear until late Tuesday evening when it arrived at Colombo anchorage.

The vessel, MSC Orion, was initially claimed by Yemeni Armed Forces to have been targeted with drones on 29 April 2024. This attack was later confirmed by naval sources and vessel-tracking data from Lloyd's List Intelligence, which placed MSC Orion in the area during the incident. This attack marks a significant escalation, indicating a shift in the threat landscape for vessels linked to Israel, the UK, or the US operating within the Indian Ocean.

Expanding operational range and its implications

In mid-March, the Houthis pledged to extend missile attacks to ships diverting around the Cape of Good Hope. This pledge materialised partially with the unverified claim of targeting MSC Veracruz on 24 April 2024 which was traveling via the Cape of Good Hope to Mina Khalifa, Abu Dhabi. The confirmed attack on MSC Orion however, represents the first substantiated instance of the Houthis extending their reach this far from Yemen.

Experts like Martin Kelly from EOS Risk Group and Ian Ralby from IR Consilium highlight the implications of this development. The expanded scope of Houthi attacks poses significant challenges for naval forces and increases risks for shipping companies, requiring reassessment of threats and protective measures for seafarers.

Most recent attacks in the Red Sea

On 15 May 2024, Reuters reported that the Houthis claimed to have targeted a US warship, "Maysun," and a vessel named "Destiny" in the Red Sea. These actions are part of the Houthis' ongoing campaign to show solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. The attack on "Maysun" involved "appropriate naval missiles," while "Destiny" was targeted because it had been en route to the Israeli port of Eilat on 20 April. Saree'a did not specify the dates when the two ships were targeted and Reuters could not independently verify the Houthis' claim of having hit the two vessels.

Despite the Houthis' aggressive rhetoric, their technical capabilities remain a limiting factor. The northern Red Sea (roughly 1,600 km) and areas east of the Gulf of Aden (roughly 800 km) are within striking distance, but the Houthis face significant challenges in effectively targeting moving vessels at these ranges. Nevertheless, this indicates a growing threat to maritime security in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and potentially the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite their technical limitations, confirmed attacks demonstrate an alarming increase in their operational reach. This evolving threat landscape necessitates enhanced vigilance and adaptive strategies from naval forces and shipping companies to mitigate risks and ensure the safety of maritime operations.

On 8 May 2024, The Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) highlighted the ongoing security issues in the waters around Somalia, the southern Gulf of Aden, and the western Arabian Sea. Ships operating in these regions are advised to exercise extreme caution due to the elevated threat levels from piracy and armed attacks, which add another layer of complexity to the already volatile situation involving Houthi threats. Consequently, the NMA has raised the maritime security level to MARSEC/ISPS level 2 in the area illustrated below. The heightened MARSEC level is valid until further notice.

Sources

• Risk Intelligence – Security Threat Update: Red Sea (15 May 2024)
• Risk Intelligence – Security Threat Update: Red Sea (8 May 2024)
• Lloyd's List: Houthis Deploy New Weapons to Secure First Direct Hit in Indian Ocean 
• Reuters: Yemen's Houthis Say They Targeted US Warship, Vessel Destiny in Red Sea 
• Norwegian Maritime Authority: Somalia, the Southern Gulf of Aden, and the Western Arabian Sea 

Update 26 April 2024

The following insights have been reproduced from Risk Intelligence's latest Security Threat Updates for the Red Sea & Gulf of Aden:

In retaliation for the Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus that resulted in the deaths of several high-ranking members of the Quds force and IRGC, a barrage of missiles and drones known as "Operation True Promise" was launched against Israel on the night of 13-14 April. These weapons were launched from different territories aligned with Iran, and although most of them were intercepted and shot down by Israeli allies outside of Israeli territory, Israeli defences successfully neutralized many of the threats. As a result, damages were limited, and there were no reported casualties from the strike.

Following the seizure of the MSC ARIES, a vessel leased from an Israeli-affiliated enterprise, speculation arose regarding a potential campaign resembling the actions of the Houthis in the Persian Gulf. However, this scenario is viewed as unlikely due to its significant escalation near relevant territories, which goes against the interests of multiple parties involved, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and China. Instead, the seizures are believed to serve as a form of political signalling directed towards Israel, the United States, and the domestic audience within Iran.

Since the occurrence of the HUANG PU crude oil tanker strike on 23 March, there have been no successful Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. Although there was an increase in attempted strikes in the past two weeks, it remained lower than previous levels. Notably, this rise coincided with the departure of the BEHSHAD, a suspected vessel involved in Iranian intelligence gathering and assisting in targeting activities. Additionally, Iran recently deployed the frigate JAMARAN to the Gulf of Aden, ostensibly for the protection of its own vessels.

The observed decline in Houthi strikes indicates that coalition efforts have successfully diminished some of the Houthis' capabilities. However, it also suggests that the Houthis perceive the current level of pressure as sufficient to achieve their political objectives. Consequently, the threat of Houthi strikes continues to affect traffic through Bab el Mandeb, as the Houthis are aware that they don't need to use further ammunition to deter commercial vessels. The lull in strikes is anticipated to persist as long as traffic remains low and Israeli, UK, or US vessels do not present themselves as targets.

Ongoing operations by US forces, in conjunction with the UK military supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, continue to target missile and drone launch sites in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Naval vessels from various countries are also actively intercepting aerial drones and missiles over the Red Sea. These efforts have effectively reduced the success rate of Houthi strikes on vessels. Notably, there have been no reported successful Houthi strikes on vessels in the Bab el Mandeb area during the past week. These military strikes, conducted under Operation Poseidon Archer, are distinct from the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, which aims to safeguard commercial shipping in the region.

In recent years, there has been an elevated risk to Israel-linked ships in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. While the seizure of the MSC ARIES represents a change in tactics, it aligns with the overall strategy of limited targeting of Israel-linked shipping. Similar incidents are expected to occur in the future. However, unless the conflict with Israel further escalates, it is unlikely that Iran will engage in more significant actions.

Persian Gulf/Gulf of Oman – threat assessment summary (April 2024)

The primary maritime threat in the region is associated with actions supported or carried out by Iran, posing risks to merchant ship transits, port areas, and anchorage zones. The current threat level is considered high. Recent incidents such as drone attacks on the CMA CGM SYMI container vessel in November 2023 and the CHEM PLUTO product tanker in December 2023 are evaluated within the context of insurgency or military operations.

On 13 April, Iran launched a substantial barrage of drones and missiles targeting Israel in retaliation for Israel's bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus. However, this incident is not expected to affect security levels in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Despite tensions between Iran and Israel over Israeli military actions in Gaza, Iran is presently observing the developments in the Red Sea and seeking to avoid any escalation that could lead to clashes with US or Israeli forces.

Threats to vessels in the region remain moderately to highly elevated, with potential variations based on specific ship characteristics. The overall security situation in the region remains tense, and maritime threats are closely linked to broader political dynamics. The recent Israel-Hamas conflict has not resulted in an increase in incidents as most actors have adopted de-escalation measures to minimize the risk of regional conflict. The March 2023 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran is expected to have a longer-term impact on threat levels in the Persian Gulf, potentially leading to future Iranian actions predominantly occurring south of the Strait of Hormuz to avoid provoking Saudi Arabia. Seizure patterns since March 2023 support this assessment.

Given the current situation, several countries conduct naval patrolling in the area. The US-led International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), based in Bahrain, includes Coalition Task Force (CTF) Operation Sentinel, which conducts naval patrols and coordination to safeguard sea lanes. The European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH), operated by the EU, also operates in the region and has a voluntary reporting scheme to enhance cooperation, guidance, and freedom of navigation for ships.

For commercial maritime operations, it is strongly advised to closely monitor the broader political and security situation and continually assess individual incidents. This approach is crucial for comprehensive threat and risk assessments, ensuring the safety of day-to-day operations and making informed decisions regarding commercial engagements in the region.

Update 4 April 2024

Reports of ongoing military actions by US forces targeting missile and drone launch sites in areas of Yemen controlled by the Houthi group continues to occur in the past weeks. Additionally, Risk Intelligence has reported that naval vessels from various countries have continued to intercept aerial drones and missiles over the Red Sea - these efforts have seemingly resulted in a decrease in the Houthis' success rate in attacking vessels.

A recent development on 20 March uncovered that the Houthis have reached another agreement with China and Russia to ensure safe passage for their ships. However, Risk Intelligence stated that the specifics of this deal remain unclear, thus raising doubts about its implications. This announcement comes at a time when concerns about misidentification incidents have grown. The attacks on the TRUE CONFIDENCE and a Russian oil-laden vessel, potentially caused by outdated information, have apparently heightened these fears.

It is anticipated that cases of misidentification may increase in the coming weeks as the number of weekly transits represents around 200 vessels, while the Houthis' motivation to continue their campaign remains intact.

In light of the situation, various stakeholders have made declarations that solidify the establishment of a new routine in the Red Sea. Maersk, for instance, has affirmed its commitment to continue transiting through the Cape of Good Hope, stating that while the military intervention has been viewed positively, it has not sufficiently reduced threat levels. Egypt has also confirmed a 50% decline in Suez Canal revenues since the conflict began, aligning with the new average traffic levels.

Update 21 March 2024

Over the past week, there have been reports of ongoing targeting by US forces of missile and drone launch sites in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Additionally, naval vessels from several countries have intercepted a large number of aerial drones over the Red Sea.

In a speech on 14 March, Houthi leader Abdelmalik Al Houthi made a statement that his group will target vessels in the Indian Ocean that are diverted towards the Cape of Good Hope if they meet the Houthis' targeting parameters. The Houthi leader also claimed that they possess a hypersonic missile capable of reaching speeds of up to Mach 8.

However, Risk Intelligence has reported that there have been no recorded strikes in the Indian Ocean following the Houthi leader's statement. There are significant doubts regarding the Houthis' targeting capabilities at the implied ranges.

On 17 March, the Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack on the LPG Tanker named MADO. The vessel was en route from Yanbu to Singapore, where the Houthis falsely alleged the tanker’s connections to the United States. This incident deviates from Saudi claims that the Houthis have refrained from targeting vessels heading towards the Saudi Kingdom.

Risk Intelligence assesses that while the possibility of strikes taking place in the Indian Ocean cannot be completely ruled out, it is more likely that the Houthi leader's statement is an attempt to impose economic costs on Israel and extend the anti-air defence zone created by naval operations in the Bab el Mandeb region. The Houthi claim of possessing a hypersonic missile capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 8 is considered improbable, and their assertion of being able to manufacture such a missile domestically is almost certainly false. In the unlikely scenario that the Houthis do possess hypersonic missiles, these missiles would probably need to be delivered by others, potentially in separate components for assembly.

Update 19 March 2024

The recent attack on the bulk carrier TRUE CONFIDENCE on 6 March resulted in the unfortunate loss of seafarers' lives, marking the first incident of its kind since November. Prior to the attack, the ship had encountered a previous incident where it was hailed by an entity claiming to be the Yemeni Navy, causing it to drift. It is suspected that the ship's aft was struck, leading to a fire in the area where the crew had gathered.

In this instance, three crew members were killed as a result of a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile strike on the ship.

The TRUE CONFIDENCE was reportedly previously financed by Oaktree Capital Management, a US-based company. However, it was owned by a non-US national through a Greece-based company called Third January Maritime Ltd. Prior to the attack, the vessel was still listed as being owned by Oaktree Capital Management.

This incident occurred as part of the Houthis' response to the Israel-Hamas conflict, and it represents the first instance of crew fatalities attributed to Houthi attacks on merchant shipping. It is worth noting that throughout 2023, only one merchant vessel crew member had died in a security event unrelated to this conflict in a different area.

After analysing all recorded incidents since November and taking into account the military strikes against Houthi forces, Risk Intelligence has assessed that the threat to merchant ships is closely tied to specific characteristics that align with the Houthis' targeting parameters and previous actions. It is highly likely that Houthi forces will continue to select specific targets rather than engage in indiscriminate attacks against civilian shipping. However, there is a possibility that they may expand their campaign to exert pressure on southern Yemen and restrict port calls for commercial vessels, particularly in Aden.

The increasing complexity and expansion of threats in the region pose a significant risk to the safety of both vessels and lives. While there is a notable international military presence, it alone cannot guarantee the secure passage of ships in the area. Therefore, it is crucial to carefully assess and consider all available mitigation measures.

In the past decade, the efforts to combat piracy have resulted in a decrease in designated threat areas within the region. However, Somali pirates have extended their activities beyond the Indian Ocean Listed Area, operating in international waters where security provisions have been historically limited.

Shipowners and managers need to adapt their security risk assessment so that they can address the evolving security landscape and mitigate risks effectively.

Update 27 February 2024

In recent weeks, the security landscape in the region has witnessed a significant upsurge in threats, characterized by their complexity and expanding reach. Reports have emerged suggesting that the Houthis have employed an "underwater drone" to target civilian ships, signalling a concerning new capability. However, due to the limited information available, it remains challenging to assess the true nature and effectiveness of this system.

One possibility under consideration is that the Houthis have successfully deployed a semi-submersible guided Improvised Explosive Device (IED), resembling a torpedo, which has been rumored since last December. The potential damage resulting from such an attack remains uncertain, given the various factors and unknowns involved in such a scenario. Coalition forces, supported by a range of surveillance and reconnaissance assets in the area, generally possess the capability to detect and mitigate such threats. However, it is important to acknowledge that this capability may not be foolproof in every situation.

Since the beginning of the Houthi campaign, vessels directly owned by Israeli companies have faced a severe level of threat, leading to a significant decrease in their transit through the Red Sea. Consequently, the Houthis have expanded their target selection to include vessels engaged in trade with Israel. Furthermore, there have been instances where attacks were likely based on outdated information from publicly accessible databases, highlighting the potential for unintended collateral damage.

The involvement of the United States and the United Kingdom in military operations has further widened the scope of potential Houthi targets. Notably, threats against these countries have received widespread attention, intensifying the risk level for vessels directly associated with both nations. This heightened risk extends to the four other countries actively supporting military strikes under Operation Poseidon Archer. Recent weeks have witnessed both attempted and successful attacks against merchant ships closely linked to the United States and the United Kingdom, demonstrating the Houthis' ongoing capabilities and their willingness to strike. These incidents have underscored that attacks are not confined solely to the southern Red Sea, as vessels have been targeted and struck in the Gulf of Aden.

Given the rapidly evolving nature of the situation, it is of utmost importance for all stakeholders to remain vigilant and closely monitor developments in the region. Risk Intelligence strongly advises implementing appropriate risk mitigation strategies to safeguard the safety and security of vessels and maritime operations.

In conclusion, the increasing threats, their complex nature, and expanding operational area require ongoing vigilance and proactive measures to protect vessels and maritime operations in the region. It is crucial for all stakeholders to closely monitor the situation and implement necessary risk mitigation strategies to ensure safety and security.

Update 15 February 2024

European Union member states are preparing to launch a naval mission in the Red Sea with the objective of safeguarding ships from attacks orchestrated by Yemen's Houthi militants. The leading role in this European naval mission, known as Operation Aspides, is expected to be assumed by Italy, focusing solely on defensive operations. The formal approval of the mission by the EU is anticipated on 19 February.

The maritime unrest in the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen has made it a hotspot for attacks on ships perceived to have connections with Israel. In response, the initial phase of the operation will involve three vessels under EU command. France and Italy already have warships deployed in the region, and Germany plans to contribute the Hesse frigate to the mission.

Given the intricate geopolitical dynamics involving multiple stakeholders, the EU must be cautious not to inadvertently escalate tensions in the region. Meticulous planning and diplomatic finesse are essential in navigating the turbulent waters of the Red Sea.

It is crucial to acknowledge the ongoing threat of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Red Sea. In this regard, reference should be made to the OCIMF publication titled "Loitering Munitions – the Threat to Merchant Ships."

Update 5 February 2024

At the time of writing, there has been a significant decline, approximately 50%, in maritime traffic in the southern Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb area between November and late January. Notably, there has been a slight increase in the number of ships passing through Bab el Mandeb without broadcasting an AIS signal. Only around 10% of merchant ships passing through Bab el Mandeb have turned off their AIS.

Naval forces have recommended turning off the AIS signal, but there is currently no evidence to support the effectiveness of this measure in mitigating risks. Some ships have been targeted despite having their AIS turned off, suggesting that the Houthis have alternative methods of identifying and tracking their targets.

Container lines made the decision in mid-December to redirect their ships on routes between Europe and Asia. The remaining container ships passing through Bab el Mandeb are mostly smaller vessels engaged in regional feeder services. However, other segments of the shipping industry have experienced a more gradual decline in traffic.

According to Risk Intelligence's latest assessment, the ongoing military strikes carried out by US and UK forces, with support from four other countries, against Houthi forces in Yemen, may not effectively deter future Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. While it is possible that the ability of the Houthis to launch missiles may be diminished over time, it will be difficult to determine if this threat has been completely eliminated.

Risk Intelligence believes that the Houthi forces will still possess the capability to launch drone attacks, which require less land-based equipment. In addition to their existing stock of drones, the Houthis have demonstrated the ability to domestically produce drones using commercial components. Therefore, it is likely that the Houthis will continue their campaign in the coming weeks, although there are now fewer potential targets that meet their criteria. Since the seizure of the GALAXY LEADER in November, Houthi attacks have been targeted rather than indiscriminate, although some may have been based on misidentification due to outdated information in publicly available databases.

Updates in Alerts

• The International Bargaining Forum (IBF) has included the Red Sea in its high risk area for crew contracts as of 22 December 2023 under the ITF Warlike and risk areas section (NB: the boundaries of the IBF high risk and warlike areas are different from the JWC listed areas.)
• Industry associations (BIMCO, CLIA, ICS, IMCA, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF) have revised the security guidance applicable to navigating in the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden following a series of attacks by the Houthis. The guidance emphasises the importance of conducting a thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessment considering any additional advice from the ship's flag state before passing through the area in question. The guidance highlights that the maritime threat from the Houthi forces is greater in the vicinity of the Yemeni Red Sea coastline and also advises against following Houthi instructions to divert to Houthi-controlled ports for detention of the ship and crew and gives direction regarding suitable waiting areas in case of decision to postpone transit through the Southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
• The following Flag States have published security circulars for their vessels when transiting the Red Sea region:
  o Panama,
  o Liberia,
  o Marshall Islands and
  o Norway
• The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) has cancelled the MSCI Alert 2024-001B - "Red Sea and Gulf of Aden – Potential Retaliatory Attacks by Houthi Forces" on 30 January.
• However, the MARAD MSCI Advisory 2023-011 - "Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels" remains active.
• On 26 January, INTERTANKO issued an update to its members stating that the threat level to ships with Israeli, UK and US interests remains high. However, targeting of vessels remains fluid and only the Houthis know who is being targeted and that its members should follow the advice contained in BMP5 and consider their policy related to keeping the AIS transmissions on during transits.

Update 26 January 2024

In response to a series of attacks and attempted attacks on civilian and naval vessels in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since November, military forces from the United States and the United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, initiated strikes against targets in Yemen. These strikes took place during the night of 11 January to 12 January, according to local time.

Subsequent strikes have been carried out as part of Operation Poseidon Archer. It is important to note that Operation Poseidon Archer is distinct from the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, which focuses on preventing and defending against future attacks on commercial shipping.

In addition, the EU member states have reached a political agreement in principle on 23 January, on the launch of a military operation to secure merchant shipping in the Red Sea. This was announced by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs after a meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels. According to diplomats, the mission should ideally commence next month.

On 24 January, the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) issued the MSCI Alert 2024-001B-Red Sea and Gulf of Aden-Potential Retaliatory Attacks by Houthi Forces, which states the following:

"There continues to be a high degree of risk to commercial vessels transiting the Southern Red Sea between 12N and 16N. While the decision to transit remains at the discretion of individual vessels and companies, it is recommended that U.S. flag and U.S. owned commercial vessels remain North of 18N in the Red Sea or East of 46E in the Gulf of Aden until further notice. Additional updates will be provided when available. This alert will not automatically expire and will be updated or cancelled as needed. Any questions regarding this alert should be directed to U.S. Naval Forces NCAGS at +973-1785-0033 (Primary/Watch Desk), +973-3940-4523 (Alternate), m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil (Contingency), or +973-1785-3879 (NAVCENT Battle Watch/Emergency)."

INTERTANKO published an update on 19 January, which advised that there are ongoing attacks against ships following the US and UK led strikes on Houthi missile sites in Yemen, which in turn has led to increased targeting of ships with US or UK interests. It should also be noted that ships with both active and inactive Automatic Identification System (AIS) have been targeted. The latest as issued by most flags now is that the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are now classified as ISPS Code level 3. INTERTANKO has further advised for shipowners and operators to continue to follow the guidance of BMP5, flag authorities, and military authorities in the area. As the situation remains volatile, it remains ambiguous that a ship will not be a target due to the uncertainties in targeting both through perceived links or by accident.

Shipowners should also consider their AIS transmission policies, with the US-led naval forces recommending ships to turn the AIS off in order to prevent the Houthis from identifying ship locations. However, the UKMTO has stated if a ship is passing through the area without AIS on, then this may delay them in their ability to send "see-and-avoid notices" directly to a ship.

Therefore, if the decision is taken to turn off AIS, then ships should instead increase the frequency of position reports to the UKMTO.

Update 17 January 2024

The joint military actions carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom have resulted in an expansion of potential Houthi targets in Yemen. Consequently, vessels associated with the US and UK, as well as the four other countries directly supporting the military strikes, face a significant level of threat.

Recent incidents in the Gulf of Aden have demonstrated that the Houthi forces still possess the capability to attack merchant ships. There have been both attempted and successful attacks on US-owned vessels, indicating the ongoing danger. It is worth noting that these attacks are not limited to the southern Red Sea, where the Houthis control a substantial portion of the Yemeni coastline and where another vessel was targeted in this area on 16 January.

The latest update from Risk Intelligence reported that while merchant ships linked to other countries participating in or supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian, as well as all other commercial vessels, face a lower level of threat, it is still considered elevated. For vessels associated with countries involved in Operation Prosperity Guardian, the primary concern lies in the potential for kinetic attacks, as the Houthi forces might focus on alternative targets. However, given their careful selection of targets, which aligns with their broader political objectives, such attacks are currently deemed unlikely.

For vessels not connected to countries participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, Risk Intelligence assessed that the lower threat level primarily stems from the possibility of collateral damage. This could occur due to misidentification, proximity to kinetic attacks, or being in close proximity to drone and missile interceptions by military forces.

In the most recent development regarding security in the region, it has been reported that European Union member states have provided preliminary support for a naval undertaking aimed at safeguarding ships traversing the Red Sea. Notably, France, Italy, and Germany have taken the lead in committing to contribute to this mission. Nevertheless, there remains a vital requirement to establish precise rules of engagement that extend beyond mere patrolling, as well as to ensure its integration with other EU operations conducted off the coast of Somalia and in the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, a critical aspect to address is whether the mission will be authorised to board suspicious vessels in the event of weapons smuggling intended for the Houthi rebels.

Yemen port situation update

At the time of writing, commercial activity at seaports in Yemen, including Aden, Rudhum Oil Terminal, Mukalla, Ash Shihr Oil Terminal, Nishtun, Mokha, Saleef, Hudaydah, and Ras Isa Petroleum Products Reception Facility are at a restricted working level due to the security situation and the coalition’s naval operations. The ports of Ras Isa Marine Terminal and Balhaf LNG Terminal remain closed.

All vessels attempting to enter Yemeni waters must obtain permissions from coalition forces and the Hadi government, as well as to expect delays and multiple inspections, which can hold up vessels for weeks at a time. It is therefore recommended that port calls should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and updates to be obtained from Skuld’s local correspondent accordingly.

Current Yemen port entry conditions:

• Owners and/or managers of merchant ships engaged in the transportation of commercial goods or services, including bilateral assistance that is not channelled through a UN agency or recognized international humanitarian organization, to ports not under the direct control of the Yemeni government are required to obtain prior clearance from the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM).
• Requests for clearance should be submitted no later than five days before the vessel's arrival at the outer limits of these ports, preferably before the vessel's departure from its loading port, depending on the availability of the vessel's documents.
• Please note that any clearance requests received after this deadline will result in delays in the clearance process. For more detailed information, including the UNVIM standard operating procedures, the list of required documents, and the clearance request form, please visit the UNVIM website.
• Vessels intending to dock at ports controlled by the Yemeni government must continue to seek entry permissions through the Yemeni Ministry of Transportation. The completed entry permission form should be filled out and sent via email to the Operations Unit of the Supreme Relief Committee at yemen.transport@gmail.com at least one week before the vessel's intended entry/arrival.
• Permission to enter Yemeni territorial waters will be granted only after an inspection carried out by the naval forces of the Saudi Arabian-led coalition.
• Upon reaching the outskirts of Bab-el-Mandeb, approximately 3 nautical miles from Yemen's territorial waters, the vessel's Master must make a notice of arrival on VHF channel 16.
• The naval forces of the Saudi Arabian-led coalition will then provide instructions on where the vessel should anchor while awaiting completion of the inspection and approval for port entry.
• Once the vessel has been granted permission to enter the port, the Master must register the vessel's arrival with the port authorities (via VHF Channel 14 or 16), and the vessel will be assigned an anchoring position until the berthing time is confirmed by the Harbour Master.

Update 15 January 2024

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and BIMCO released further advises today that the security situation in the Red Sea area of 16N and 12N remains unstable.

The situation remains unpredictable and BIMCO further expects that the "present security conditions may prevail for still some time".

In particular, following the recent airstrikes in the Southern Red Sea from both sides – U.S. forces and the Houthis – over the weekend, with the most recent anti-ship cruise missile attack by the Houthis towards the USS Laboon on 14 January at 4:45pm (Sanaa time).

As such, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and BIMCO continue to recommend shipping companies to consider avoiding operations in the area and to reposition to north of 18N or east of 46E.

The UKMTO currently advise vessels transiting the area to exercise caution and follow flag state and industry guidance.

Update 12 January 2024

In response to a series of recent attacks and attempted attacks on civilian and naval vessels in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a coalition of military forces led by the US, along with the United Kingdom and supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, carried out strikes on targets in areas of Yemen controlled by the Houthi forces.

These strikes mark a significant escalation in the ongoing Operation Prosperity Guardian, which began in December with the objective of deterring and defending against further attacks on commercial shipping. The decision to conduct these strikes followed a joint statement on 3 January 2024, which was widely perceived as a final ultimatum to the Houthi forces. In addition to the original coalition, the statement included the participation of eight additional countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and Singapore.

Given these developments, various industry bodies including BIMCO, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) have advised that Red Sea transits are currently "extremely high risk". Accordingly, alerts were issued today recommending that all merchant ships refrain from operating in the Red Sea – specifically the areas from 12 to 16 degrees North and West of 46 degrees East in the Southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Straits - for at least the next 48 to of 72 hours.

Having consulted further with Risk Intelligence, they advised that it is important to note that claims of indiscriminate attacks against merchant ships have been made by the US and other countries, but available evidence does not fully support this conclusion. Risk Intelligence's thorough analysis of all incidents since November 2023, taking into account the military strikes against the Houthi forces, leads them (Risk Intelligence) to conclude that the threat to merchant ships is based on specific targeting rather than indiscriminate attacks on civilian shipping. It is therefore highly likely that Houthi forces will continue to select individual targets rather than engage in indiscriminate attacks on merchant ships.

Vessel type	Threat type	Threat level
Vessels specifically linked to Israel through ownership, port calls, trade with and/or commercial relationship between Israeli companies and owners/operators	[1] Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	SEVERE
Vessels linked to the United States, United Kingdom and other countries involved in direct military strikes against Houthi forces	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	SEVERE
Vessels linked to other countries participating or supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	ELEVATED
Other merchant ships in transit through the Red Sea/Bab el Mandeb	Kinetic attack due to misidentification, potential proximity to the above threats (collateral damage)	ELEVATED

Footnote: [1] The term "kinetic" generally refers to missiles or other traditional types of weapon systems that physically engage targets, whereas non-kinetic tools can include cyber, electronic warfare and other means of attack.
Source: Risk Intelligence A/S (as of 12 JAN 11:00 CET)

Risk Intelligence further assessed that the threat level to vessels directly owned by Israeli companies has been assessed as severe throughout the Houthi campaign. However, these vessels have largely ceased transiting the Red Sea. As a result, Houthi forces have expanded their potential targets, sometimes justifying them with tenuous links to Israel. The current escalation has led to an increased range of potential targets for the Houthi forces, especially considering their recent threats against the United States.

Consequently, vessels associated with the US and UK, as well as the four other countries directly involved in military strikes, face a severe threat level. Although retaliatory attacks against merchant ships from these countries are the most convenient option for the Houthi forces, it is unlikely that they will refrain from targeting naval vessels, which have already been attacked.

For merchant ships affiliated with other countries participating in or supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian, as well as for all other commercial vessels, the threat level is assessed as lower but still elevated. In the case of vessels related to countries involved in Operation Prosperity Guardian, the main concern lies in the potential for kinetic attacks, given that they may be perceived as alternative targets by the Houthi forces. However, due to the Houthi forces' careful selection of targets, which aligns with their broader political goals, Risk Intelligence evaluated that such attacks are currently deemed unlikely.

For vessels unrelated to countries participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, the increased risk stems from the possibility of collateral damage or misidentification in proximity to kinetic attacks.

Given the ongoing volatility in the Red Sea, it is advisable for shipowners, operators, and Masters to thoroughly evaluate the risks associated with each transit on an individual basis. Additionally, it is recommended to refer to the published "Interim Industry Transit Advice, Southern Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden – 19 December 2023". Among other information, the document includes considerations about routing and vessel hardening.

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) have also issued a guidance document on 23 December 2023 - highlights to these important guidance has been published in our earlier update dated 10 January 2024.

Reference may also be made to the earlier update (dated 22 December 2023) related to "Guidance on commercial operations" and recommended mitigation measures.

Update 10 January 2024

CMF GUIDANCE FOR NAVIGATING THE SOUTHERN RED SEA

Please find the below useful guidance for shipowners and operators, as extracted from the recent CMF publication of 23 December 2023. In conjunction with the CMF guidance, reference should also be made to the Maritime Global Security website for any further industry advice.

On approach to the Southern Red Sea

Reporting measures and information flow

The UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such as UKHO Q6099. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are encouraged to register with the UKMTO. Registration establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and UKMTO. UKMTO acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing liaison with military forces in the region. UKMTO administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These include:

1. Initial report (upon entering the VRA).
2. Daily reports (update on ship's position, course and speed). The frequency of these may be increased by ships in the SRS especially if AIS "dark".
3. Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port).
4. Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary).

UKMTO can communicate with ships and CSOs directly, to disseminate Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region:

1. Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a Lat/Long and with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct UKMTO-to-ship telephone calls to all ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships the earliest possible alert.
2. Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/reports that are relevant within the region.

UKMTO offers regular information to ships on its website and in a weekly report summarising the previous week's activity. UKMTO is also able to offer Masters and CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their passage planning in the region. Companies that are interested can contact UKMTO at +44(0)2392 222060 or watchkeepers@ukmto.org.

Consideration of day or night transit

Timings and navigation of SRS transit remain the vessel Master's responsibility. Based on analysis of Houthi activity, it appears that UAVs are generally active during daylight hours. Transiting through the area to the west of Al Hudaydah during the hours of darkness may reduce the threat from UAV attack or frustrate efforts to target MV with missile systems. Although the detection of waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) at night is difficult, it is also difficult for the Houthis to effectively direct them towards moving targets without visually identifying them.

Use of AIS

Adherence to IMO AIS guidance / regulations remains the responsibility of the Ship Manger and Master. Ships with AIS switched on and off have been attacked. Switching off AIS makes it marginally more difficult to track or target a ship but may also hinder the ability of the military to provide support or direct contact.

Navigating in the Southern Red Sea

Actions in the event of an attack

If contacted on VHF by "Yemeni Navy" and instructed to alter course to Al Hudaydah or another location on the NW coast of Yemen:

• a. Ignore the VHF call and continue on passage if safe to do so.
• b. Call for coalition warship on VHF Channel 16, inform them of your location, situation, state your intentions and seek advice.
• c. Contact UKMTO, own Company Security Officer and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command maritime operations centre at +973 1785 3879.  

Update 8 January 2024

The situation remains dynamic, with the list of potential targets expanding - possible links to Israel include port calls by vessels, trade with Israel in general, or commercial relationships with Israeli companies. Although vessels directly owned by Israeli companies face a higher threat level, they are currently not transiting the Red Sea. As a result, Houthi forces have widened their scope of potential targets to include the aforementioned categories. However, it is important to note the increased risk of collateral damage, especially in the densely trafficked southern Red Sea. There have been instances where Houthi forces have unintentionally targeted other merchant ships, indicating a dynamic and evolving threat that requires close monitoring. One such incident was reported on 3 December 2023 involving the bulk carrier AOM SOPHIE II.

The Houthis possess significant targeting capabilities, and can identify previous links to Israel. Attempts to conceal these links may be detected by the Houthis, although the precise criteria they use remains unknown. It is anticipated that such attacks will persist, unless deterred by the US or through behind-the-scenes pressure on the Houthis.

Vessels in transit should be mindful of the possibility of encountering small armed craft in the Indian Ocean area, particularly in the Gulf of Aden. These crafts could include fishermen, traders, smugglers, militias, irregular military forces, or naval and coast guard patrol vessels from southern Yemen or northern Somalia. The boarding of the product tanker CENTRAL PARK in the Gulf of Aden on 26 November, is believed to be linked to Houthi actions against vessels connected to Israel.

There is an ongoing potential for pirate operations in the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden. The Maltese-flagged bulk carrier RUEN was reportedly boarded about 400 nautical miles off the coast on 14 December and is suspected to have been hijacked. The situation regarding this incident remains unresolved, and it is unclear whether it represents an isolated event or an increased threat to merchant vessels in transit.

Several naval forces, including the US Navy, the Royal Navy, and the French Navy, have responded swiftly to the increased attacks. The French Navy has redeployed a Multi-Mission Frigate to provide support in the area. In response to the surge in attacks and the suspension of transit through the Bab el Mandeb by several companies, Operation Prosperity Guardian was launched on 19 December.

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Guidance for Shipping Navigating the Southern Red Sea (SRS) was published on 23 December, which mentions that Operation Prosperity Guardian has commenced and "is a presence and deterrence mission in support of the Freedom of Navigation, that will be conducted by an international Naval force under CMF, commanded by Combined Task Force 153".

The CMF publication goes on to mention that vessels transiting in the SRS "will note a significant increase in the number of coalition warships and aircraft operating in the area as part of this operation. A review of BMP5 and the extant MSTC guidance for southern Red Sea will be conducted with industry".

Update 22 December 2023

Guidance on commercial operations

Ship transits

Several shipping industry organisations have published the Interim Industry Transit Advice, Southern Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden – 19 December 2023 which should be referred to by shipowners, managers and operators with vessels scheduled to transit the Red Sea. Among other information, the document includes considerations about routing and vessel hardening.

Please also refer to the below guidance from Risk Intelligence:

Vessel registration and incident reporting

It is strongly recommended for all merchant ships transiting the Western Indian Ocean, the Somali Basin, the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea to register with UKMTO and the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). Any incidents or suspicious activities should also be reported to UKMTO and MSCHOA.

Contact details UKMTO

Email: watchkeepers@ukmto.org
Phone: +44 2393 222060
Website: www.ukmto.org

Contact details MSCHOA

Email: postmaster@mschoa.org
Phone: +33 298 220 220 or +33 298 220 170
Website: www.mschoa.org

If a vessel is under attack, US naval forces in Bahrain are able to coordinate assistance.

Phone: +973 1785 3879

Vessel operators are also advised to contact the respective flag state for additional guidance or requirements regarding incident reporting procedures.

Mitigation measures

Risk Intelligence strongly recommends merchant ship operators to assess whether the respective vessel has been owned or managed by Israel-affiliated companies in the past. Such information may not have been updated in publicly available databases and could lead to misidentification of current commercial links with Israel.

Prior to voyages through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, ship operators should conduct a thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessment in line with shipping industry best practices. In addition, the following measures should be considered:

• Constant monitoring of the security situation, enabling vessels to avoid locations with recent or ongoing incidents.
• Introduction/update of contingency plans on the company level to address the possibility of seafarers being injured, killed or kidnapped during a security incident. The plan should include contingency and emergency plans; appropriate drills should be completed.
• Crew briefings and scenario drills based on a valid and relevant anti-attack plan to ensure that incidents are reported and alarm is raised without delay when required. Drills should include scenarios with major damage and casualties.
• Enhancement of firefighting, evacuation and damage control procedures, taking into account the possibility of significant damage as a result of direct targeting or collateral damage.
• Enhancement of medical equipment to deal with multiple casualties.
• Emergency contacts placed readily available on the bridge.
• Bridge team briefing regarding hailing/harassment via VHF, prepared responses and immediate contact with naval forces in the respective area. (Local authorities' calls on VHF may be an act of spoofing or even targeting, underlined by several incidents in recent days which involved self-proclaimed 'Yemeni authorities' or the 'Yemeni navy' ordering merchant ships to alter course.)
• Preparation of citadel with emergency provisions and functioning satellite phone.

In general, existing BMP5 recommendations have been developed to deter piracy. While the guidance included in BMP5 is relevant to deter illegal boardings, it offers virtually no mitigation against current threats such as attacks by missiles, drones or – potentially – waterborne IEDs ('drone boats').

Ship operators should also consider to issue specific voyage guidance for transits through the Red Sea and/or the Gulf of Aden. This guidance should consider specific scenarios (e.g. aerial or waterborne threats, hailing on VHF) and include actions for the crew to minimise the impact of any security incident.

Update 20 December 2023

Following the recent incidents in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden related primarily to Houthi forces, there is now a significant threat to merchant ships linked to Israel through a variety of commercial relationships. Although threats will vary on a case-by-case basis, the overall threat level for these vessels is now assessed as high.

The situation is evolving as the list of possible targets is expanding. Links to Israel may now be port calls by the respective vessel, owners/operators conducting trade with Israel in general or owners/operators being in commercial relationships with Israeli companies. To mitigate risks, it is recommended that Members evaluate whether their vessel was owned or managed by an Israel-affiliated company in the past year.

While the threat level to vessels which are directly owned by Israeli companies is assessed as even higher, it should be noted that virtually no such vessels are currently transiting the Red Sea. Houthi forces have, therefore, significantly expanded their potential targets, including the categories mentioned above.

At the same time, it is important to highlight the increased threat of collateral damage, particularly in the southern Red Sea with dense maritime traffic. It is very likely that Houthi forces have missed their intended targets on several occasions in recent days, increasing the potential for unintended strikes against other merchant ships. Although there has been an increase in military presence in the Red Sea, the distribution of this presence has been uneven despite successful interceptions of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Moreover, this is a highly dynamic and evolving threat which must be monitored closely in light of ongoing incidents.

Vessel type	Threat type	Threat level
Vessels specifically linked to Israel through ownership	Seizure and detention; limited kinetic attack such as a drone strike	SEVERE
Vessels linked to Israel through port calls, trade with Israel by owners/operators or commercial relationships between Israeli companies and owners/operators	Seizure and detention; kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone)	HIGH
Vessels in transit without any involvement in Israeli trading	Kinetic attack due to misidentification, potential proximity to the above threats (collateral damage)	ELEVATED

Source: Risk Intelligence A/S (as of 18 DEC 18:00 UTC)

The Joint War Committee (JWC) has issued an amendment to the Listed Area of the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea (refer to JWLA-32) on 18 December to widen the high-risk zone in the Red Sea to 18 degrees north from 15 degrees north previously. The JWC deems the Red Sea as a high risk after a surge in attacks on commercial ships and to "reflect the missile range".

JWLA-32 amendments to the Listed Area of Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea reads as follows:

QUOTE

Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Southern Red Sea
The waters are enclosed by the following boundaries:

a) on the northwest, by the Red Sea, south of Latitude 18°N
b) on the northeast, from the Yemen border at 16°38.5'N, 53°6.5'E to high seas point 14°55'N, 53°50'E
c) on the east, by a line from high seas point 14°55'N, 53°50'E to high seas point 10°48'N, 60°15'E, thence to high seas point 6°45'S, 48°45'E
d) and on the southwest, by the Somalia border at 1°40'S, 41°34'E, to high seas point 6°45'S, 48°45'E

excepting coastal waters of adjoining territories up to 12 nautical miles offshore unless otherwise provided.

UNQUOTE

Moreover, the initiation of Operation Prosperity Guardian by the United States has been declared with the objective of safeguarding trade vessels in the Red Sea. Representatives from the Pentagon have disclosed that this multinational maritime security initiative will involve the participation of various countries, including the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain. Regrettably, there is presently a lack of specific information regarding the operational procedures and naval resources to be employed under Operation Prosperity Guardian.

Operational and security risks

Maritime Global Security website – security advice

Interim Transit Advice for the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden - 19 December 2023

Best Management Practices: BMP5 

Legal implications

Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea: contractual implications – 6 December 2023

 

Update 12 December 2023

On 9 December 2023, Yemen's Houthi movement said that it will target all ships heading to Israel, regardless of their nationality and warned all international shipping companies against dealing with Israeli ports.

In recent weeks, the Houthis have attacked and seized several Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea and its Bab al-Mandab Strait, a sea lane through which much of the world's oil is shipped.

It is expected that such attacks will continue, subject to any deterrent response from the US, whose warships might also have been targeted with drones, and pressure applied on the Houthis behind the scenes, either through Saudi Arabia or other intermediaries, or a deal involving Iran.

Interim transit advice for the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden was published by BIMCO, ICS and other bodies in November 2023 and remains in place. The advice notes the following:

1. Threats from "airborne activities are probably greater during daylight hours where targets are more easily identified and attacked/boarded, but the challenge of visually detecting and classifying small contacts at night such as a water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) remain" – hence, the exposure to the threat is greater in daylight hours however, an attack during the hours of darkness cannot be excluded.
2. Ships planning a passage through the Southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden should conduct a thorough ship and voyage specific threat and risk assessment, considering any additional advice from their flag state.
3. Houthi forces have laid mines to protect port entries for ports under their control, and on rare occasion, such mines have become detached from their tether and have drifted into the traffic lanes.

There is also some potential for collateral damage due to vessels being in proximity to a missile/drone attack against another target or due to mistaken targeting.

Risk Intelligence released a client briefing report on 8 December addressing the viable threats to shipping, which reads as follows:

The seizure by the Houthis has achieved significant attention and highlights their opposition to Israeli actions in Gaza. The possibility of future vessel seizures hinges on several factors:

• Whether the Houthis obtain any concessions through negotiations, potentially involving relevant parties from the Middle Eastern region.
• The Houthis' ability to effectively manage the seized vessel, including the well-being and repatriation of the crew, as well as ensuring its security in Hudaydah.
• Potential responses from Israel or an increase in the presence of naval forces in the area.
• Behind-the-scenes pressure exerted on the Houthis through intermediaries or potential agreements with certain Middle East states.

It is therefore difficult to predict how this situation will play out. Based on our current assessment of the situation, Risk Intelligence sees the following threat levels.

Vessel type	Threat type	Threat level
Vessels specifically linked to Israel through ownership	Seizure and detention; limited kinetic attack such as a drone strike	HIGH
Vessels engaged in trading directly with Israeli ports	Seizure and detention; protests and harassment	ELEVATED
Vessels in transit without any involvement in Israeli trading	Potential proximity to the above threats	MODERATE

 

Given the ongoing volatility in Israel, it is advisable for shipowners, operators, and Masters engaged in trade with Israeli ports to thoroughly evaluate the risks associated with each port call on an individual basis. Additionally, the following measures are recommended:

• Regularly consult local sources for up-to-date information from vessel agents, local authorities and Skuld's correspondent, to obtain the most current and reliable security information available.
• Abide by the guidance provided by the flag administrations and port authorities regarding the relevant ISPS security levels.
• Review and implement pertinent security and contingency plans as appropriate – enhance Best Management Practices.
• Ensure that crewmembers aboard vessels heading towards Israel and transiting the Red Sea are well-briefed and trained about any imminent security threats in the region.
• Ships with Private Maritime Security Teams onboard are advised not to escalate Rules for the Use of Force (RUF).

Israel is included in the Joint War Committee's (JWC) Listed Areas for Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils. As such it is also recommend confer with the vessel's war insurer in advance of arrival at any Israeli port or transit within the Red Sea.

Reference can be made to the Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea article published on 6 December, which answers some of the trade-related and contractual questions shipowners might have during this turbulent time.